In a principal-agent model, we analyze the consequences of bonus taxes agents need to pay, limited deductibility of bonuses from company prots and a corporate income tax (CIT). We explore how these tax instruments aect managerial incentives and how they change the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium. Introducing bonus taxes decreases the agent's net bonus and reduces eort.
Introduction
In the context of the recent nancial and scal crisis, a public debate about high payments for bankers and other managers, their compensation packages and possible regulating mechanisms came up. Several politicans called out greed and recklessness in the nancial system 1 and considered bankers' pay to be disproportionately high.
2 In response, some countries reformed and many others discussed the tax treatment of managerial compensation. Nevertheless, there is not much known about the various eects thereof. This paper compares three taxation instruments in a unied principal-agent framework and lls this gap. We use a tax system with tax instruments that were discussed -and partly even implemented. These are bonus taxes, limited deductibility of bonus payments and a corporate income tax (CIT) . Comparing them, we analyze their eects on managerial incentives, the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium and their welfare implications. This will be done using a principal-agent model in which the agent with limited liability can receive a xed wage and a bonus and in which both the principal's prot and the agent's income are potentially subject to the following taxes. First, we consider a CIT payable by the principal and based on net prot. Second, we introduce a bonus tax which is a surtax on managerial bonuses payable by the agent. This tax is com- 3 In UK, the bank payroll tax had to be paid by the banks. Eventhough, as our interest in the tax incidence and the eects on compensation structure does not depend on the taxpayer, we model the bonus tax in line with literature (e.g. Dietl et al., 2011 ) that it be payable by the manager.
4 See Ireland to reintroduce 90% bank bonus tax (guardian.co.uk, 2011, Jan 26). the deductibility of bonus payments as operating expenses against the corporate income tax. Limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate tax base broadens the corporate tax base and leads to a higher corporate tax burden, ceteris paribus. In the US, annual salaries exceeding 1 Mio USD are not deductible. 6 In other countries, limited deductibility is publicly debated. In Germany, limited deductibility of business expenses for bonus payments is requested by the parties Die Linke and Bündnis 90, Die Grünen. In Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Council and the Council of States also tried to incorporate a limited deductibility of salaries exceeding 3 Mio CHF in a referendum but were blocked by the National Council.
7
Our results suggest the following: For a given compensation structure, a bonus tax directly lowers the agent's net bonus and leads to a reduced eort choice once it is introduced. In contrast, neither limited deductibility nor a CIT aect existing managerial incentives. In equilibrium, where the principal anticipates the agent's optimal eort choice, any taxation of bonuses will lead to reduced eort and net bonus. In the case of limited deductibility, the principal accounts for his own higher tax burden and thus incentivizes a lower eort level by reducing the agent's bonus. A bonus tax, however, can also lead to an increased gross bonus payment by the principal. Nevertheless, both mentioned ways of bonus taxation are close substitutes and lower welfare. Compared to a situation where only a CIT is used to raise tax revenue, both reduce the principal's and the agent's rent. With full deductibility of bonuses thereof, a CIT is superior as it aects neither managerial incentives nor the design of the incentive contracts used in equilibrium. Without regard to its political implications, we nd that governmental intervention can increase welfare towards the rst best solution. This can be achieved by using a corrective tax system: subsidizing bonus payments while nancing those expenses by way of an increased CIT.
Existing research on executive compensation generally can be divided into two lines of literature: the managerial power approach and the ecient-contracting approach.
8 In the former view, compensation agreements are seen as an outcome 6 According to 162 (m)(1) IRC, for the CEO and the next four highest-paid ocers of a rm, no deduction for remuneration that exceeds 1 Mio USD for the tax year is allowed. It should be noted that there is a complex exception for compensation paid under a performance-based plan.
7 See Switzerland: Proposals aecting executive compensation (pwc.ch, 2012, Oct).
8 Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2013) provide an overview on the contributions of powerful, rent-seeking managers that can inuence their own pay. It was mostly proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2002) , Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) . We, and literature in large part, focus on the latter line of ecient or optimal contracting by using agency theory. This line of literature studies the relationship between a rm owner and a manager who is incentivized to operate the company. Competitive market forces foster optimal contracting and allow an analysis of the problem of imperfect information and moral hazard.
9 Our framework builds on the assumption of limited liability, which was rst introduced by Sappington (1983) . He shows that a rst best outcome is not obtainable between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agent. In contrast to Sappington (1983) , in which the agent made an ex-post eort choice after observing the realization of the state of nature, we analyze a situation where the agent makes an ex-ante eort choice as in Innes (1990) , Park (1995) and Kim (1997), among others. As Laont and Martimort (2001, p. 194) we additionally assume two possible outcomes with a continuum of eort levels. In order to compare tax instruments, we expand their specication in that respect and adjust the structure of compensation payments to our purposes.
The eects of dierent tax instruments on executive compensation have also been studied empirically. Hall and Liebman (2000) analyze how various tax rates (personal, corporate and capital gains tax rates) aect the structure of executives' compensation and nd little evidence for tax policy inuencing remuneration. Katuscák (2004) evaluates the impact of personal income taxes on the pay-to-stockprice sensitivity generated by stock-option and restricted stock grants. While, for option grants, higher tax rates decrease the pay-to-performance sensitivity, no such eect can be found for the sensitivity generated by restricted stock grants.
For bonus taxes as modeled in this paper, von Ehrlich and Radulescu (2012) explore the reaction of compensation structure to the above mentioned UK bank payroll tax which was introduced in 2009. Their data suggests a reduction in bonus payments of 40%, which, however, was accompanied by an one-to-one increase in other pay components not subject to the tax. Altogether, they nd that overall compensation was not aected by the bonus tax. 9 Early contributions in this area were made by Ross (1973) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Harris and Raviv (1979) , Holmström (1979) , Shavell (1979) , and Grossman and Hart (1983) among others.
Apart from the literature on agency theory, this paper is related to studies on taxation and regulation of the nancial sector.
10 Regarding bonus taxation, this literature can be split in two basic lines of research: with and without externalities. The rst one models taxation in combination with bailout or competition as a systemic externality. For the externality of bailouts, Besley and Ghatak (2011) nd that a bonus tax aects the tradeo between eciency and rent extraction, whereas Keen (2011b) claims that corrective taxation requires a charge on the bank's borrowing which can be supported by minimum capital requirements. According to Besley and Ghatak (2013) extend this model to an agent who can inuence expected outcome next to eort also via his risk-taking behavior. There, a bonus tax induces higher risk-taking and lower eort by the agent. The compensation structure shifts towards a xed salary. The eects of a bonus tax in a two-country framework with endogenous or exogenous reservation wages are studied in Radulescu (2012) . She also nds that the introduction of a bonus tax in one country results in a decline in the agent's eort and that the incidence mainly falls on the rm's shareholders. In the case of endogenous reservation wage, results are largely similar and depend on the strength of the negative reaction of the reservation wage to the bonus tax. This paper contributes to the literature as it -next to an analysis of the eects of a bonus tax -additionally examines the eects of dierent tax instruments such as a CIT and limited deductibility of bonus payments from the CIT. We provide a unied framework, making the mentioned tax instruments and their eects on The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the model will be introduced and the optimal compensation structure chosen by the principal will be derived. In addition, the dierent tax instruments and their eects on the eort level and the bonus payments are analyzed. Section 3 discusses the welfare eects of the dierent tax instruments. Section 4 concludes. 2 Incentive Contracts in a Principal-Agent-Setup
In the following subsections we will rst introduce the model and solve the equilibrium (section 2.1). In section 2.2, comparative statistics will follow.
Model and Equilibrium
Principal-agent setup.
The model specication is as follows: There is one risk-neutral shareholder (principal) who delegates the task of operating the company to a risk-neutral manager (agent), who has limited liability and zero initial wealth.
11 This is done by oering a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, who has an exogenous outside option u ∈ R + 0 . If the manager accepts the contract, he starts operating the rm by choosing an unobservable eort level from a continuum e ∈ [0, 1].
For the manager, the eort he exerts comes at an eort cost C(e). In line with the literature, we make two assumptions on the eort cost function: First, it is considered as strictly convex (C (e) > 0, C (e) > 0, C (e) > 0) with C(0) = 0. 12 Second, to ensure interior solutions, the Inada conditions C (0) = 0 and lim e→1 C (e) = ∞ are imposed on the cost function. Firm prot is random and depends on the state of the world s ∈ {1, 2}. It can take two values: high (and equal to π 1 ) or low (and equal to π 2 ) with π 1 > π 2 ≥ 0. Eort e determines the probability by which prot is high. By appropriate normalization, this probability is equal to e. Once the prot π s is determined, the agent is paid. As compensation for the task of operating the company, the manager is oered a linear payment 11 We decided on a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent as we are interested in the eects of dierent tax instruments rather than in risk sharing issues.
12 Note that C (e) > 0) ensures strict concavity of the principal's maximization problem.
Though, in order to satisfy the second order conditon for a maximum, C e
e SB is sucient.
scheme consisting of two components. First, the agent is paid a xed wage A ∈ R + 0 independently of the state of the world. Secondly, the principal can remit an additional bonus when the task was successful, i.e. if π s = π 1 .
13 This bonus is specied such that a bonus rate b ≥ 0 is applied on the dierence between the prot levels in the good and the bad state of the world. This gives, in total, a bonus b(π 1 −π 2 ) to be added to the xed wage A. The principal keeps the residual of the prot. Accordingly, the expected payo EU P for the principal is
Government.
Before the take-it-or-leave-it contract is oered to the agent, the government can implement up to three dierent tax instruments. First, the principal's operating prots net of compensation payments can be taxed by a corporate income deductible at all from the CIT base, whereas the xed wage is fully deductible. It follows that, with bonus payments, the rm's tax base, and, accordingly, its tax burden, is higher the lower α is.
14 Third, bonuses can be subject to a bonus tax, t b ∈ [0, 1), which has to be paid by the agent.
The agent's total net-compensation, x 1 in the good state of the world and x 2 if the bad state of the world occurs, can be denoted by:
13 Because the principal can observe prot but not the agent's eort, an enforceable contract can only be specied on realized prot π S . 14 Because of these two tax instruments, the principal's expected payo EU P is dened as the dierence between operating prot π s and compensation payments, taking into account the applied tax rates and deductibility.
When the principal oers a contract to the agent, the agent maximizes his expected net income E(x)−C(e) by choosing eort e. Depending on the proposed xed wage, bonus payments, his eort costs and taxes, the agent's maximization problem is therefore given by
from which we get the following rst order condition:
The agent's eort choice will be such that the marginal (net of tax) benet of an increase in eort equals the marginal eort costs. Taking the agent's optimality condition into account, the principal in the rst stage chooses a compensation structure consisting of xed wage A and bonus parameter b which maximizes his expected payo EU P . His maximization problem is as follows:
e SB ∈ arg max
Equation (5) (6) is binding, whereas the participation constraint (5) is not (in case of strict inequality). In addition, we impose the limited liability constraint (7) on the agent's net compensation.
15 Thus, the compensation in any state of the world cannot be negative due to the wealth restrictions the agent is faced with.
As the bonus payment is positive by denition, we assume the xed wage to be non-negative.
16 For x 2 , the constraint is binding, whereas it is slack for x 1 . Proposition 1. Suppose that eC (e) − C(e) ≥ u holds. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium (A
where the principal chooses to oer a xed compensation A SB = 0 and a bonus rate
and the agent's eort choice is dened such that
Proof. See Appendix A1.
The fact that the xed wage A SB = 0 comes from the assumption on the 15 Constraint (7) ensures that the principal can not apply the general solution of making the agent the residual claimant of the rm to overcome the Moral Hazard problem when both the agent and the principal are risk neutral. This has been shown for example by Harris and Raviv (1979) or Shavell (1979 eC (e) − C(e) ≥ u, this bonus is in expectation already higher than would be necessary in order to satisfy the participation constraint (5). The principal would like to pay a negative xed wage, as this would lead to a binding PC. This, again, would leave a higher rent for him. As per assumption, the limited liability constraint (7) prevents him from paying negative compensation; thus, the agent gains an expected rent
due to his informational advantage combined with his limited liability.
Equation (9) also shows, that only a bonus tax has eects on existing managerial incentives. The introduction of a bonus tax decreases the agent's net bonus und leads to reduced eort by the agent. Limited deductiblity has no eects on existing managerial incentives as it has to be borne by the principal via the CIT.
Combining equations (8) and (9) from Proposition 1, we get the following equation which denes the second-best eort level e SB that is induced by the principal:
This second-best eort level under moral hazard is lower than in the rst-best case, where eort e F B is observable and contractable. In the rst best scenario, First we look at a bonus tax on bonus payments made if the agent's task was successful (π 1 is observed). As we can see from the optimality conditions (equations (8) and (9)), the conditions for the optimal bonus and the optimal eort for both the principal and the agent depend on t b , whereas the xed wage is not aected by a bonus tax.
Corollary 2. Ad (i): According to the agent's FOC (3), a (higher) bonus tax reduces the agent's marginal net of tax benet while marginal costs remain unchanged. From this follows that the agent will reduce equilibrium eort as long as the bonus rate is not increased in such a way that it perfectly compensates for the bonus tax he constraint binding is also possible. This payment will be made whenever the agent exerts the desired eort e F B -no matter whether the task was successful or not.
19 As we are interested in the dierential taxation of compensation components, we abstract from a taxation of the xed wage. Including a personal income tax, t i ∈ [0, 1), based on all of the agent's income components would mean that bonuses would be burdened twice with taxes if both t i > 0 and t b > 0. Note that for the equilibrium xed wage A SB = 0, a personal income tax and a bonus tax would have the same tax base and therefore would be substitutes.
bears. This again does not pay for the principal as incentivizing the same eort level as before is more expensive if the bonus payment is subject to a bonus tax.
Using equation (11), one can see that equilibrium eort strictly decreases. The principal's marginal expected prot gain from eort remains unchanged, while the marginal expected employment costs of eort increase with the bonus tax.
Therefore, equilibrium eort decreases.
Part (ii) of Corollary 2 shows that the total eect of a bonus tax on the bonus rate is ambiguous. There are two eects driving the bonus rate: equilibrium eort and the bonus tax. As the agent reduces equilibrium eort, he expects a lower net-of-tax bonus as his marginal cost of exerting eort also decreases. Ceteris paribus, this lowers the (net-of-tax) bonus rate. On the other side, there is the tax-eect from the additional bonus tax that has to be paid. As the agent is only interested in his net-wage, the principal has to compensate him for the additional tax burden. This eect, ceteris paribus, increases the (gross) bonus rate which the principal has to pay to the agent.
Second, for the CIT and limited tax deductibility of bonus payments, the described tax-eect of a bonus tax on the bonus rate does not exist. Limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT-base broadens the tax base for the CIT and, so, indirectly increases the principal's tax burden. The agent, in contrast,
is not subject to this tax and does not include it in his FOC (3) . From this, we can already follow that, in equilibrium, the eect on eort level and bonus rate will always go in the same direction. For the agent, net and gross bonus rates do not dier for these instruments. Still, there is an eect on eort and the bonus payment via the principal's optimization. Proof. See Appendix A3.
Part (i) of the corollary follows from equation (11) . With full deductibility of bonus payments from the CIT, a (higher) CIT changes the marginal expected prot gain of eort to the same extent as do the marginal expected employment costs. Therefore there is no change of the bonus rate and, as a result, no adjustment in the desired eort level.
20 Parts (ii) and (iii) of Corollary 3 show the distortion due to the limited deductibility of bonus payments from the CIT-base.
According to equation (11) , there is still no change in the principal's marginal expected prot gain due to the combination of CIT and limited deductibility compared to a situation with full deductibility of bonuses. However, limited deductibility increases the marginal expected employment costs via broadening the CIT-base in case the agent was successful. Therefore, equilibrium eort decreases and a lower bonus is paid in equilibrium. This eect is more pronounced either for the CIT the less deductible bonus payments are, or for limited deductibility the higher the CIT already is.
Welfare Comparison of the tax instruments
We have seen how the dierent taxation instruments distort the implemented eort level (dened by equation (11)) and the agent's bonus rate. We now want to assess whether or not one instrument is superior to the others with regard to welfare implications. For this purpose, we dene welfare as the sum of agent's payo EU A , principal's payo EU P and tax revenue T . This yields welfare EU A + EU P +T = eπ 1 +(1 − e) π 2 −C (e). Furthermore, we suppose that the government has to raise an exogenous tax revenue to fulll its public duties. We denote this revenue requirement by B. By assumption, the government sets its tax rates before the contract between principal and agent is specied. Thus, it takes the equilibrium results from Proposition 1 as given.
The total expected tax revenue consists of two parts: The expected bonus tax paid by the agent, T b = eb(π 1 − π 2 )t b , and the expected corporate income tax paid by the principal, T cit = et (π 1 − A − αb(π 1 − π 2 )) + (1 − e) t(π 2 − A). total expected tax revenue E (T ):
As all parties involved in our model (principal, agent and government) are risk neutral, all payments (wage, tax) have only distributional impacts and do not aect welfare. Altogether, our welfare optimization problem can be written as
where the government chooses its tax instruments in such a way that overall eciency is highest while still being able to raise in expectation the desired tax revenue B from equation (12) . Note that without the tax revenue constraint (13) and being able to directly choose the eort level, the welfare maximizing government would opt for the following result:
Confronted with (13) and knowing that the second-best case, due to the agent's limited liability rent, is already characterized by an ineciently low eort e SB < e * , the government will choose a tax structure which least distorts the agent's eort choice beyond that.
Optimal mixture of tax instruments
Let us rst consider a situation in which the government can choose between the tax instruments in a normal range -meaning t, t b ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ [0, 1]. In this setting, the government will always choose to raise its necessary tax revenue solely with the CIT. According to Corollary 3, in the absence of limited deductibility (α = 1), this tax instrument does not distort the principal's desired eort level beyond the limited liability rent. Equation (11) has the implication that bonus taxation should not be used for revenue purpose because both a bonus tax and limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT are inferior to a CIT.
Comparison of bonus tax and limited deductibility of bonuses
Assume restrictions, e.g. an exposure to tax competition, which limit the CIT tō t < t * and therewith prohibit the government from raising it to the optimal level analyzed above. In this case, there is some tax revenue which has to be raised from one of the remaining instruments: limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT and a bonus tax. In order to compare the dierent bonus taxation regimes, we maximize welfare with an exogenously given CITt < t * by choosing t b and α.
From corollaries 2 and 3, we know that both a bonus tax and limited deductibility strictly decrease equilibrium eort e SB . Due to this distortion, a welfare maximizing government will not raise tax revenue beyond its requirement B and will set the CIT to the highest possible levelt. It follows that the tax revenue constraint (13) will be binding, allowing α and t b to each be expressed as a function of the other. Inserting either α (t b ) or t b (α) in equation (11) to dene the eort induced by the principal shows that any combination of the two instruments which satises the tax revenue requirement (13) > t * b
while making bonus payments fully deductible from the CIT. Any α (t b ) =
[π 2 + e (π 1 − π 2 )] is welfare equivalent and induces the principal to incentivize eort e SB t < e SB . Compared to the optimal structure of tax instruments (t * , α * , t * b ), it follows that taxation of bonuses reduces welfare as equilibrium eort will be ineciently low. Moreover, they are substitutes as they distort eort and welfare to the same extent.
3.3
Increasing welfare by subsidizing bonus payments
Note that welfare maximizing eort is indirectly dened by equation (14) , which in our model cannot be reached as information asymmetry and limited liability lead to moral hazard. The principal is faced with a trade-o between eciency and distribution of rents. Because of the additional marginal costs of the agent's limited
SB , the principal can reduce his expected employment costs by inducing lower eort. This distortion in inducing eort increases the principal's expected rent EU P at the expense of the agent's rent EU A . Because of reduced eciency, this goes along with a welfare loss.
Unlike the principal, the government does not pay attention to the distribution of rents. Its only concern is the maximization thereof. With moral hazard and limited liability, a welfare increase can be achieved if the government is allowed to choose corrective tax instruments, i.e. a negative bonus tax or a very high deductibility of bonus payments (α > 1), while nancing these subsidies by a higher CIT.
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By subsidizing costs related to incentivizing the agent, the government can reduce the principal's expected employment costs. This in turn leads the principal to induce a higher eort level. The eort level with subsidy e sub is shifted towards the welfare maximizing eort e * . According to equation (11) for second best eort, this is the case for small deviations from the equilibrium as long as the tax
, on the right hand side, is smaller than 1. Deviating from the tax structure (t * , α * , t * b ), the government can increase welfare by choosing t sub > t * and nancing with the higher expected revenues either α sub > α * = 1 or t sub b < t * b = 0. This leads to higher net bonus payments for the agent.
Proposition 4 summarizes the results gained above:
Proposition 4. Given a tax revenue requirement B, the following tax structures maximize welfare: (i) For t, t b ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ [0, 1], the optimal tax structure is given by
, full deductibility (α * = 1) and no bonus tax (t * b = 0).
(ii) Ift < t * , any combination of a bonus tax t b and deductibility of degree
[π 2 + e (π 1 − π 2 )] is welfare maximizing.
(iii) Allowing for t b < 0 and/or α > 1 is welfare increasing compared to
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The dierent tax combinations analyzed in the subsections above also inuence the distribution of rents between principal and agent dierently. According to equation (10), the agent gains an expected rent EU A = eC (e) − C (e). As the marginal expected rent eC (e) is always positive by assumption, the agent's rent increases when a higher eort level is incentivized and decreases with a less incentivized eort level. As e SB t < e SB < e sub in the cases analyzed above, the agent's rent is highest when a bonus subsidy is paid and lowest when the CIT cannot be chosen, but is exogenously given.
The principal's rent can be expressed by simplifying his maximization problem (4) to
which, by assumption, is strictly concave in e and has a global maximum (in the presence of moral hazard) at the eort satisfying (π 1 − π 2 ) = [C (e) + eC (e)].
According to the ndings above, the principal's expected rent is maximized for (t * , α * , t * b ) with eort e SB . Whenever either the bonus tax or the limited deductibility deviate from their optimal level t * b and α * , the principal's expected net prot EU P decreases. This is the case for both an exogenous CITt and a bonus subsidy (t b < 0 or α > 1).
Conclusion
In this paper, we used a principal-agent model to study the eects of dierent tax treatments of managerial compensation. More precisely a corporate income tax, a special tax on bonuses and limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate income tax were subject to our analysis. We identied how these tax instruments aect existing managerial incentives, how they change the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium and, keeping total tax revenue constant, what their welfare eects are.
Introducing an additional bonus tax decreases the agent's net bonus and brings him to reduce eort. The rm anticipates this reaction in equilibrium and incentivizes a lower eort level by adjusting the gross bonus paid to the agent. Weighing up the principal's (reduced) desired eort and (higher) bonus tax costs, this gross bonus payment can be higher or lower than it would be without a bonus tax. If the dierence in potential operating prots is suciently high, a bonus tax increases bonus payments to the agent.
Limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate income tax base has no direct eect on the gross-and/or net bonus payment and, thus, on the agent's incentives. Because limiting the tax deductibility of bonuses makes bonus payments more costly to the principal, in equilibrium he oers a lower bonus rate.
This leads to lower eort exerted by the agent in equilibrium.
This negative eect on eort cannot be found under a corporate income tax with full deductibility of bonuses thereof. In our setup, this tax has neither an eect on managerial incentives nor on the design of the incentive contracts used in equilibrium.
In terms of welfare, this makes the corporate income tax superior compared to the other tax instruments as it does not distort the equilibrium eort induced by the principal beyond the adjustment due to moral hazard. Bonus taxation as well as limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate income tax are close substitutes in their distortionary eects when it comes to the decision of how much eort to incentivize. In spite of dierent mechanisms, both reduce eort to an ineciently low level and therewith lead to lower welfare compared to the situation in which only the CIT is used for tax revenue.
In contrast to reforms of tax treatments of managerial compensation conducted by politicians, the model suggests a corrective tax system which, despite moral hazard, increases welfare towards the rst best solution. This can be reached by subsidizing bonus payments to the agent either via a negative bonus tax or via a deductibility of bonuses higher than 100 percent and a simultaneous increase in the corporate income tax nancing the subsidy. By doing this, the government can reduce the principal's marginal expected employment costs and thereby increase equilibrium eort and welfare.
Finally, one can state that both a bonus tax and a limitation of deductibility can be used if the government has distributional objectives towards rm owners and managers. Limited deductibility or a bonus tax should only be used if the objective is to reduce both the managers' and rm owners' rents. This is additional to the disadvantage of ineciently low welfare. If welfare is to be maximized, a subsidy on managerial compensation should be paid to the companies. This results in a higher rent for managers and a lower rent for rm owners.
Appendix A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Due to the limited liability constraint the agent is faced with, the principal cannot pay a negative xed wage. Thus the constraint will be binding for x 2 such that A SB = 0. Taking this and the result of a non-binding participation constraint (5) due to the assumption e SB C (e SB ) − C(e SB ) ≥ u, the optimal eort induced by the principal indirectly is given by
Rearranging yields the optimal bonus parameter denoted in equation (8):
Together with the agent's optimal eort choice according to (9) , eort can be expressed as
Note that the second order condition for a maximum is satised whenever
which by assumptions C (e) > 0 and C (e) > 0 is always the case. Existence and uniqueness can be proven by combining the agent's and the principal's optimality conditions (8) and (9), which can be rearranged to
By the imposed Inada condition on the cost function, the right hand side is zero for e = 0, whereas the left hand side is positive by assumption. According to (17) the right hand side is monotonically increasing in e. Together with the Inada condition lim e→1 C (e) = ∞, there is exactly one intersection for the unique equilibrium e = e SB .
A2. Proof of Corollary 2
By using (8) and (9), we obtain
SB with the total dierential
where
From this we get
Keeping the corporate income tax and deductibility constant (dt = dα = 0), the eect of t b on e SB and b SB (π 1 − π 2 ) can be expressed by 
A3. Proof of Corollary 3
We use equations (18) and (19) to prove the eects of both a CIT and limited deductibility.
Keeping the bonus tax and limited deductibility constant (dt b = dα = 0), the eect of t on e SB and b SB (π 1 − π 2 )can be expressed by
and
Note that for both equations the denominator is positive.
Proof of Part (i):
With full deductibility (α = 1) of bonus payments as business expenses, equa- (8) shows that this is the case whenever α < 1:
Less deductiblity increases the marginal eect of the CIT if 
Proof of Part (iii):
For limited deductibility, keeping the CIT and the bonus tax constant (dt = dt b = 0), the eects of α on e SB and b SB (π 1 − π 2 ) can be expressed by 
this is always the case.
A4. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof will be done by comparing the welfare maximizing eort characterized by π 1 − π 2 = C (e * ) with the second best eort induced by the principal which is indirectly dened through equation (11) and rearranged as (π 1 − π 2 ) = 1−αt (1−t)(1−t b )
C e
SB + e SB C e
SB
. As the welfare function is concave in e, eort below e * reduces welfare. Thus, as long as e SB < e * , an increase in eort is welfare improving. According to (17) the right hand side is monotonically increasing in e such that the government can inuence the optimal eort induced by the principal by adjusting the tax structure 1−αt (1−t)(1−t b ) towards the lowest possible level.
Proof of Part (i):
Follows directly from Corollary (2), Part (i) and Corollary (3), Part (i).
Proof of Part (ii):
With an exogenously given CITt < t * , the government cannot raise the desired tax revenue solely by the CIT, but has to use either limited deductibility or a bonus tax or both to fulll T (t b , t, α) = B. As the tax revenue constraint (13) will be binding, we can use equation (12) in order to express α as function of t b , α = α (t b ). Inserting this expression in the eort (16) incentivized by the principal shows that t b cancels out. Therefore, eort e SB is independent of t b (and of α as is was expressed by t b ) if the shift in t b has to be compensated by a shift in α.
Proof of Part (iii):
When using α * = 1, t * b = 0 and t * = < t * b = 0 or by granting a higher deductibility of corporate expenses α sub > α * = 1.
